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Abstract: This study investigates the influence of business-specific, bank-specific, and political-
specific networks on small firm investments in Vietnam. Also, we aim to explain how these social 
networks substitute the weaknesses of local institutions. Examining a set of more than 9,800 firm-
year observations of small businesses in Vietnam from 2005-2015, we find that social ties with bank 
officials can boost firm investments; social ties with government officials can help firms overcome 
institutional voids; whereas social ties with businesspeople appear trivial to investment decisions. 
More importantly, we propose that networking, especially networks built upon connections with 
government officials can substitute local institutions by addressing the weaknesses in (1) inefficient 
legal enforcement, (2) corruption, (3) bureaucratic compliance, and (4) non-transparent governance 
system. 
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1. Introduction 
Investment is an essential entrepreneurial activity for small businesses (Zhou, 2013). After the initial 
investment (venture creation), deciding to make post-establishment investments appears to be 
critical for entrepreneurs. In this study, investment is measured as the additional financial capital 
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invested in a venture, whether that be in the form of fixed assets or working capital. Firms that make 
investments may or may not grow, but firms that do not invest certainly cannot sustain their 
competitive advantages and market share, leading to declined growth rates or the threat of collapse 
(Nguyen, 2019). 
Investment is made based on exploiting business opportunities, i.e., gaps in the market. Identifying 
these is highly dependent on the information that entrepreneurs obtain from their surrounding 
events and environments (Baron & Ensley, 2006). For this reason, entrepreneurs are inclined to 
strategically build their social networks to expand their pool of information, and also to obtain 
productive resources and favours from the relationships embedded in their networks (Du et al., 2015; 
Putnam, 1993). Social capital, despite having been frequently linked to firm performance in previous 
studies (Santarelli & Tran, 2013), is rarely scrutinised in relation to small business investments, 
which are of course crucial for economic performance and sustainable growth. 
As such, the first research question in this study is that what types of social networks are more 
important to firm investment decisions? To answer this question, we examine three types of 
networks, namely business-specific, bank-specific, and political-specific. In each type of network, we 
measure the number of active contacts linked with entrepreneurs. Given that the context of analysis 
is Vietnam, which is a developing country with a transition economy associated with immature 
financial systems and incomplete institutional settings, the analysis of networking ties with “resource 
keepers”, i.e., bank and government officials is particularly interesting (O'Toole et al., 2016). 
More importantly, we also strive to understand the underlying relations between these social 
networks and local institutional settings, which are represented in this study by the governance 
quality of local governments. 
Governance quality is related to the process whereby local officials deliver public services, and has 
much to do with their attitude, behaviour, service quality, and reliability (Nguyen et al., 2018). There 
has been a long-held assumption, either implicitly or explicitly, that in less developed institutional 
environments (e.g., the developing countries), networking is more important to doing business than 
it is in the developed countries (Du et al., 2015; Nolan, 2011; Santarelli & Tran, 2013). However, the 
mechanisms through which networking might moderate the weaknesses of local institutions remain 
largely unexplored. As such, the second research question in this study is that how do social networks 
facilitate small business investments in the context of low-quality local governance environments? 
3 
 
Examining a panel dataset of more than 9,800 firm-year observations of small businesses (mostly 
household ventures) in Vietnam over the 2005-2015 period, we show that only bank-specific 
networks directly influence investment decisions, political-specific networks help firms overcome 
institutional voids, whereas business-specific networks, interestingly, appear to be redundant. Social 
ties with bank officials are key to the finalisation of business opportunities, where entrepreneurs 
seek funding from external financiers (banks) (Nguyen et al., 2006). As such, we suggest that it may 
not be that entrepreneurs in Vietnam lack business opportunities, but rather that their key obstacles 
are the deficiency of capital (financing constraints) and support from local authorities. 
Also, this study demonstrates that social networks can substitute a set of formal forces of local 
governance. Specifically, the mechanisms through which social capital substitutes institutions could 
be through addressing the weaknesses in local (1) inefficient legal enforcement, (2) corruption, (3) 
bureaucratic compliance, and (4) non-transparent governance system. We therefore propose that 
social capital functions as a smaller and rougher version of institutions in domains where the “rules 
of the game” are deficient. 
This study is well integrated with the literature that examines social capital in the context of 
entrepreneurship in Vietnam. Social capital in general and its special Chinese form – Guanxi – have 
been widely investigated in the context of China, and recently linked to the economic decisions and 
organisational performance of Chinese firms, see for example Bian (2018). However, very little has 
been done concerning Vietnamese Quanhe (Vietnam’s version of Guanxi). By extending the 
discussion of social capital/Guanxi to Vietnam – a context characterised by weak and incomplete 
institutions – this study highlights the importance of social networks, especially the ties associated 
with bank officials and government officials, to doing businesses. 
2. Literature  
2.1. Social capital 
Social capital has become an increasingly popular research topic in organizational management 
studies. The development of this concept has largely been attributed to sociologists; namely, Coleman 
in education (Coleman, 1988), Putnam in political science (Putnam, 1993), and Granovetter and Burt 
in social networks (Granovetter, 1973, 1985, 2005); (Burt, 2003, 2007). Only recently, has social 
capital caught the attention of economists seeking to incorporate non-economic factors into 
conventional economic theories (Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000). 
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While sociologists map social structures to seek out the meaning of social capital, economists are 
more inclined to approach social capital from the “capital” perspective. Stiglitz (1999) defines social 
capital as tacit knowledge, a collection of networks, an aggregation of reputations, and views 
organizational capital as a social means of coping with moral hazard and incentive problems. It is 
obvious that this definition of social capital is broader and appears to be more rationale-driven than 
its equivalence in sociological literature. Interestingly, some economists even dispute the use of the 
term capital in the name. Solow (1999) suggests using the term “behaviour patterns” to describe 
“things as trust, the willingness and capacity to cooperate and coordinate” instead of social capital. 
Meanwhile, Arrow (1999) advocates for abandonment not only of the metaphor of capital but also of 
the term social capital as a whole. 
Given that social capital is a difficult and complicated concept (Solow, 1999), we have adopted for 
this study the bricolage (i.e., pragmatism) method of Claude Levi-Strauss’s, in which both the 
sociological and economic viewpoints are sensibly adopted to address the effects of social networks 
on firm investment. 
2.2. Guanxi in Vietnam 
Guanxi does not have a precise definition in the literature (Luo et al., 2012). However, studies seem 
to agree that Guanxi is a form of social capital that is specific to China (Bian, 2017) and other countries 
in the Southeast Asian region (Cotterell, 2014). Scholars working intensively with this concept, such 
as Bian, Luo and their colleagues, note that Guanxi has a complex set of cultural meanings and 
behavioural implications.1  
Burt and Burzynska (2017), in an effort to synthesise the Guanxi literature, defines Guanxi as a tie in 
which relative trust is high and is not dependent on third parties. This type of social tie is naturally 
embedded in family relationships. As such, Guanxi serves as a mechanism by which quasi-familial 
relations can be created to cultivate trust among non-kin (Guo & Miller, 2010). 
Guanxi as a business practice is essential in Vietnam. Guanxi’s equivalent terminology in Vietnamese 
is Quanhe, which has more or less the same meaning. The influence of Quanhe on Vietnamese 
organizational behaviour and economic outcomes receives little research interest compared to its 
Chinese counterpart. Even though there is, as yet, no systematic analysis of Quanhe, we seek some 
initial understanding through previous studies in the relevant fields. Specifically, Dalton et al. (2002) 
find that family in Vietnam continues to be the central focal point of social life. Compared with China, 
 
1 See, for example Bian (2017), Bian (2018), Bian and Ang (1997); also Luo et al. (2012), and Luo (2007). 
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the Philippines and Japan, the gap between family networks and other networks is greater in Vietnam. 
This finding implies that quasi-familial relations, or more specifically, “familising” non-kin 
relationships would be important to building trust among individuals (Turner & Nguyen, 2005). 
Given that Quanhe is important in the context of Vietnam, entrepreneurs need to carefully map their 
networks so as to successfully extract social capital from their social ties. The first and most 
important ties for entrepreneurs, obviously, are business ties. Having a strong and durable Quanhe 
with businesspeople may help entrepreneurs running small businesses gain access to otherwise 
unreachable resources. Sorenson (2017) asserts that social capital, in the form of business ties, 
appears to be far more valuable to entrepreneurs in the East compared to the West, the reason being 
that businesspeople in the East are keen to build almost clique-like connections (Burt & Burzynska, 
2017). To be filtered into these small groups of closely connected businesspeople (and hence to enjoy 
the concomitant social capital), each entrepreneur must be active in bonding (strengthening) their 
business networks and linking (creating) connections with key persons in their local markets. A 
person who belongs to no business group, who has no group identity, is a person without business. 
Besides business ties, social ties built through fostering relationships with bank officials and 
government officials are particularly essential to entrepreneurs in Vietnam. While evidence on 
Vietnam is scarce, scholars have demonstrated that establishing Guanxi with bank and government 
officials is important to small businesses in China. For example, regularly entertaining and giving gifts 
to bank officials helps firms obtain more bank loans (Du et al., 2015); meanwhile, political affiliation 
helps firms secure “fair treatment” from local governments and provides them with informational 
advantages (Zhou, 2013). In the context of Vietnam, some studies initially suggest that firms that have 
a  closer relationship with government officials can get loans of longer duration (Dinh et al., 2012; 
Pham & Talavera, 2018). 
It is noteworthy that Vietnam’s economic system (i.e., socialist-oriented market economy) share 
many similarities with the Chinese system (Nguyen et al., 2011).2 One prominent common feature is 
the monopoly of state-owned financial institutions in the economy. The system is intrinsically biased 
against the private sector, which leaves entrepreneurs running small firms in inferior positions when 
gaining access to financial capital (Nguyen et al., 2006). Another notorious shared feature is the level 
of bureaucracy associated with the governance system (Nguyen et al., 2018). In underdeveloped and 
 
2 Socialist-oriented market economy is the official title given to the current economic system in the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam. It is described as a multi-sectoral market economy, where the state sector plays the 
decisive role in directing economic development, with the eventual long-term goal of developing socialism. 
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incomplete institutional settings, local authorities have substantial room to “play the game” off-road, 
i.e., to deviate from the rules. This mismatch between the rules and play of the institutional game 
inevitably motivates entrepreneurs to build quasi-familial relations with officials, who have the 
power to make arbitrary decisions on the allocation of resources. 
In short, previous studies show that Quanhe is a legitimated practice in doing business in Vietnam. 
Also, given the historical and contemporary social and political conditions, Vietnam might be a 
context in which the social capital derived from business-specific networks, bank-specific networks 
and political-specific networks plays an essential role in determining small business behaviour, 
including investment strategy. 
3. Networks and firm investment 
3.1. Networks with businesspeople 
A broader set of social networks with businesspeople in the same sector is beneficial to firm 
investments. We subscribe to Le Van et al. (2018) and propose that business ties accelerate a firm’s 
access to resources that are not under its control/ownership by providing it with more information, 
increasing its visibility in the local markets thus reducing asymmetric information and improving its 
trustworthiness in its embedded networks. 
First, having wider networks with others in the same industry will help entrepreneurs stay up to date 
with the newest trends in their markets, whether these be material markets or product markets 
(Sorenson, 2017). By exchanging information with more businesspeople, entrepreneurs are able to 
build up a broader and more complete picture of the opportunities (e.g., new technology) and threats 
(e.g., new entrants) in their business environments, enabling them to pursue a more informed and 
timely investment strategy. 
Second, a broader network reduces asymmetric information and helps establish calculative trust 
among its members. Therefore, an entrepreneur who can successfully signal competence to a larger 
number of social ties in the network may obtain corresponding favours (e.g., a better trade credit 
scheme), which may then be used to finance/support new investment projects (Du et al., 2015). 
Trade credit and reciprocal financial support from local business communities are important to the 
investments of small businesses, especially in developing countries with underdeveloped financial 
institutions (Cull et al., 2009). Without such a system of networking and mutual trust, the flow of 
finance among small businesses cannot be successfully activated. 
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Third, networking with more people in the same tribe (in this case: industry sector) could drive 
variation out of group behaviour and reinforce the status quo (Burt, 2007). This may reduce 
opportunistic incentives in transactions (e.g., hold-ups) by increasing the opportunity costs of risk to 
reputation. Embeddedness could therefore be a reliable signal of trustworthiness (Granovetter, 
2005). As such, it could be expected that the wider the connection a firm has in its local sector (in 
terms of the number of business ties), the more social capital (leading to other forms of capital) the 
firm will generate to support its investment projects. 
3.2. Networks with bank officials 
Besides business-ties, networks built upon relationships with bank officials may generate substantial 
social capital for private firms. In the context of Vietnam, networking with bank officials has many 
features of Quanhe (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). This type of network requires entrepreneurs to build 
quasi-familial relations with bank officials, which not only promote trust and sentiment in the 
relationship but also facilitate resource exchanges. 
Building a broader set of Quanhe ties with bank officials is particularly important for two reasons. 
First, bank loans are the major external finance source for SMEs, but access to bank loans is limited 
(Carreira & Silva, 2010). The extant literature has recognised that small businesses are typically 
financially constrained because of their age and size liabilities. Due to informational asymmetries 
(e.g., insufficiently long and trackable performance records), banks usually regard lending to SMEs 
as riskier than lending to well-established firms, leading to an element of credit rationing (Fraser et 
al., 2015). Given that access to finance is crucial but limited, maintaining strong ties with many bank 
officials appears to be a prudent networking strategy. 
Second, the banking systems in developing countries are largely controlled by the state, which 
favours relationship-based rather than arms-length transactions. Nguyen et al. (2006) suggest that, 
in the absence of effective market institutions and business data, banks in Vietnam face considerable 
uncertainty when lending to small businesses. Consequently, banks rely on trust when lending to 
their private business clients. Given that lending decisions are made arbitrarily and are contingent 
on the level of trust, it is beneficial for small firms to strengthen and widen their interactions with 
bank officials. Networking serves as a mechanism of “information transfer”, in which firms can 
convey information about their reliability and creditworthiness to potential lenders (Zhan, 2012). 
This should enable lenders to build up a better picture of the financial and operating situations of the 




In general, Quanhe embedded in bank-specific social networks helps firms to reduce informational 
asymmetries and establishes intimacy, which may lead to better treatment overall when applying for 
bank loans. 
3.3. Networks with politicians 
Quanhe ties to government provide gains in information, influence, or solidarity. These gains may 
open access to key resources, including information of strategic policies, preferential treatment, or 
similar benefits (Arnoldi & Villadsen, 2015). In particular, Ahlstrom and Bruton (2006) document 
that relationships associated with government officials and politicians are positively related to firm 
performance and growth in East-Asian transition countries. This could be explained by the 
considerable power and influence exerted by government officials who approve projects and allocate 
resources (Pham & Talavera, 2018). In the context of Vietnam, the power of local authorities may be 
even more substantial due to the mismatch between the “rules of the game” (the central laws and 
regulation systems) and the “play of the game” (the application of laws and regulations at local level). 
Political-specific networks are important because of the resource and protection effects they offers. 
The resource effect includes the informational advantage (opportunities) that may help “insider” 
businesses make the first move and gain competitive advantages in the market (Zhou, 2013). Also, in 
developing countries, governments often play a significant role in allocating productive resources 
(e.g., capital, labour, energy) (Su & Bui, 2017). Thus, those entrepreneurs that have broader 
connections with the government enjoy advantages in gaining access to such resources (e.g., financial 
subsidies). These non-transparent communications and biased resource allocations stem from 
culture-specific “group identification”, which emphasises a strong sense of family-like social 
exchanges and hinges heavily on the interpersonal connections seen in restrictive political networks 
(Chen et al., 2013; Zhan, 2012). 
Meanwhile, the protection effect indicates protection for property rights in the absence of effective 
legal systems. Entrepreneurs may find that in weak institutional settings, exploiting political 
connections may be a particularly effective mechanism for protecting property rights because of the 
coercive power exercised by government officials. Government officials, for their part, have 
incentives to protect the property rights of economic actors with whom they have political 
connections because they (or the members of their families) will extract at least some of the rents 
generated by these connections (Zhou, 2013). 
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In the light of this, it is clear that the confidence boost that entrepreneurs receive from being able to 
build upon the competitive advantages extracted from their political-specific networks (e.g., private 
information) may prompt a higher rate of investments. Nguyen (2019) finds, in the context of 
Vietnam, that entrepreneurs in regions with a higher level of governance quality are more likely to 
increase the reinvestment rates of their ventures. This could result from the effects of increased 
institutional trust (trust in government) on entrepreneurs’ confidence, which subsequently boosts 
investment incentives. 
Given the discussion on the importance of business-specific networks, bank-specific networks, and 
political specific-networks, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis H1: In Vietnam, network ties with (a) businesspeople; (b) bank officials; (c) 
politicians and civil servants are positively associated with firm investments. 
4. Local governance and firm investment 
Local governance, in this study, is defined as the governance quality of local governments (Nguyen et 
al., 2018). It indicates the execution and implementation of national laws at the local level – or the 
“play of the game” in the terminology of Williamson (2000). A set of well-designed general 
institutional configurations needs not being effective in practice without being executed by a set of 
well-structured governance forces. 
Local governance is now well-known to be an essential determinant of entrepreneurial investment, 
especially in developing countries (Nguyen et al., 2018). The reason is that small businesses, due to 
their age and size liabilities, are typically bounded in their local markets, which are strongly shaped 
by the governance quality of local governments rather than by broader general constitutional 
configurations(Nguyen et al., 2018). Meanwhile, within a weak national institutional environment 
(i.e., developing countries), there is significant variation in governance quality across regions (Du & 
Mickiewicz, 2016). This sub-national institutional heterogeneity is created by the incompleteness of 
the underdeveloped institutional settings, which enable central laws to be haphazardly implemented 
at the local levels.  
Improvements in local governance quality are expected to be associated with firm investment, for 
the following reasons. The first is the effect of a reduction in local transaction costs. Entrepreneurs 
may find that the creativity and cleverness of local authorities in implementing central policy and in 
designing their own initiatives for the development of their local private sector are important for 
improving institutional environments and subsequently reducing transaction costs (Malesky et al., 
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2015). This reduction in transaction costs may then lead to higher investment incentives. The second 
effect results from an improvement in institutional trust (trust in governments) (Efendic et al., 2015). 
In weak institutional settings, entrepreneurs may find that an improvement in governance quality 
reduces the burden of local negative norms (e.g., corruption) (Holmberg et al., 2009). Therefore, they 
are more inclined to increase their trust in local governments (Efendic et al., 2015). This positive 
perception may boost their inclination to make investments. 
Since the effects of local governance on firm investment and performance are widely confirmed in 
the context of Vietnam (Malesky et al., 2015; Nguyen & Canh, 2020; Nguyen & van Dijk, 2012), in this 
study, we focus on exploring the role of social networks in the presence of weak governance quality. 
We shall argue that network ties provide similar benefits to local governance (i.e., reduced 
transaction costs and improved trusts); as such, can substitute local governance in boosting firm 
investments where governance quality is weak and incomplete. 
5. Networks and local governance 
Social networks function much like formal institutions, albeit on a smaller scale. One of the key 
common functions of both social networks (informal institutions) and formal institutions is that they 
exert some type of expectation on the agents embedded in them, whether these be individuals or 
organisations. So, why are people inclined to create social networks or Quanhe (Guanxi) even though 
a set of institutions and legislation already exist? Helmke and Levitsky (2004) suggest that the key 
motivational reason lies in the inefficiency, fragmentation, and unreliability of the set of formal 
institutions in effect, which lead people to coalesce into groups with their own specific “rules of the 
game” that then become local networks. 
In this saying, networking appears to become more important when the formal institutional settings 
are weak or incomplete. Specifically, we suggest that the effects of social networks on firm investment 
are stronger in regions having weaker local governance settings. The general mechanism is that 
social capital may substitute institutions by reducing transaction costs (uncertainties) and 
facilitating collaboration (trust) (Gedajlovic et al., 2013). Therefore, in regions endowed with weak 
local governance, entrepreneurs may seek business opportunities and external support for their 
investment projects by actively expanding their social networks. This mechanism is indeed in line 
with a large body of literature on the substitution between formal and informal institutions (Holmes 
Jr et al., 2013; Stiglitz, 1999; Williams & Vorley, 2015). 
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Meanwhile, local governance, in the context of Vietnam, is of five dimensions: legal institutions, 
corruption, market-access regulations, business environment, and institutional openness (PCI 
Report, 2019). Also, Nguyen (2019) shows that these governance forces impose dissimilar effects on 
local entrepreneurial activities. As such, in the following sections, we shall explore the potential 
benefits of social networks on firm investments when these governance forces are weak and 
incomplete. 
5.1. Legal institutions 
Legal institutions, in this study, indicate the private sector's confidence in provincial legal institutions; 
whether firms regard provincial legal institutions as an effective vehicle for contracting dispute 
resolution, or as an avenue for lodging appeals against property-rights violation (PCI Report, 2019). 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) analyse a sample of European colonial countries and confirm the 
importance of property-rights institutions and contracting institutions in facilitating productive 
economic activities (such as entrepreneurial investments). 
In the case that legal institutions are weak, entrepreneurs may need to rely on their social networks 
to secure investment projects. Specifically, having broader network ties with businesspeople 
increase firms' visibility in local markets and thus reduce informational asymmetries (Li et al., 2015). 
This positive effects of networking allow firms to make effective informal arrangements with their 
investment stakeholders ex-ante, without a need to rely on legal institutions, which are ineffective, to 
resolve potential disputes. As such, it is expected that the effect of networking with businesspeople 
and legal institutions on firm investments are substitutive. 
Meanwhile, having a set of wider networks with bank officials enables small businesses to reduce 
asymmetric information with potential financiers (Du et al., 2015). The "connected" status provides 
a signal to banks that firms are trustable and trackable. This serves to improve the confidence of 
financiers to forward credit to such firms even without a set of efficient legal institutions. The reason 
is that firms holding close relationships with many banks are perceived to be trustworthy and less 
risky (Malesky & Taussig, 2009). When banks estimate potential disputes and holdups to reduce 
significantly, they may be eager to fund "connected" firms' investments. As such, it is expected that 
the effect of networking with bank officials and legal institutions on firm investments are substitutive. 
Also, having a set of wider network ties with politicians and civil servants help firms obtain 
confidence in the protection toward their private properties.  Dixit (2004) argues that when a 
government cannot provide adequate formal protection for property rights, economic actors will 
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attempt to seek informal projection by establishing Quanhe (Guanxi) with politicians. Therefore, it is 
expected that in weak legal institutions environment, relationships with politicians and civil servants 
help secure firm investment. 
Empirically, in the context of China, Zhou (2013) evidently demonstrates that political connections 
substitute for, rather than complement, formal market and legal institutions in facilitating 
entrepreneurial reinvestment. Also, in Vietnam, Malesky and Taussig (2009) observe that although 
Vietnam's banking sector is in a transition toward a healthier system, it still allocates a 
disproportionate share of credit to "connected" enterprises. Analysing 6,400 private firms in Vietnam, 
they show that relationship-based lending has served as an effective substitute for legal institutions. 
Therefore, we propose: 
Hypothesis H2a: In Vietnam, the effects of social networks on firm investment are stronger in 
regions with lower quality of legal institutions. 
5.2. Corruption 
Corruption in this study is a measure of how much firms pay in informal charges, how much of an 
obstacle those extra fees pose for their business operations, whether payment of those extra fees 
results in expected results or "services," and whether provincial officials use compliance with local 
regulations to extract rents (PCI Report, 2019). Corruption exerts adverse effects on entrepreneurial 
investments because it increases transaction costs in doing businesses (Tonoyan et al., 2010). Also, 
corruption impairs levels of trust in the ability of the state and market institutions to reliably and 
impartially enforce law and the rules of trade (Anokhin & Schulze, 2009). 
In a corruption environment, expanding network ties with businesspeople may help firms avoid 
getting involved in bribery transactions, which may dampen their incentives for investments. The 
reason is that firms may share resources (e.g., information) with their partners in the networks 
without a need to contact corrupt politicians and government officials (Zhan, 2012). Moreover, 
thanks to the signalling effect, a firm could send a positive message to corrupt officials about its 
Quanhe (Guanxi) relationships with businesspeople in the networks, who have stronger connections 
with the government (Zhou, 2013). Utilising this shielding effect, firms may avoid being harassed by 
corrupt officials. These positive effects associated with networking with businesspeople may 
encourage firms to invest in a corrupt environment. 
Meanwhile, having a set of more extensive networks with bank officials in a banking system largely 
controlled by the state help firms establish a legitimate identity, i.e., being treated as a member of the 
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institutionalised financing networks (Nguyen et al., 2006). This legitimacy helps firms avoid 
bureaucratic harassments, such as corruption in the process of loans application; thereby securing 
their investment incentives. 
Also, in this line of argument, having a set of wider network ties with politicians and civil servants 
allows firms to utilise the Quanhe (Guanxi) networks to legitimise their identity (Rand & Tarp, 2012). 
This positive effect of network ties with the government, in a weak institutional environment, help 
firms not only avoid corruption harassments but also obtain protection and enjoy special treatments 
from local authorities (Zhou, 2014). Empirically, in the contexts of China and Vietnam, it is well 
documented that firms with stronger political affiliations are exempted from the screening radar of 
corrupt officials (Du & Mickiewicz, 2016; Rand & Tarp, 2012). Therefore, we propose that: 
Hypothesis H2b: In Vietnam, the effects of social networks on firm investment are stronger in 
regions with a higher level of corruption. 
5.3. Market-access regulations 
Market-access regulations, in this study, indicate the procedures that entrepreneurs must go through 
to gain access to (1) land and land use rights and (2) business licenses and other production permits 
(PCI Report, 2019). Without obtaining operation permits and land use rights, firms are unable to 
enter the local markets. Efobi et al. (2019), in a sample of four African countries (Ethiopia, Nigeria, 
Tanzania and Malawi) evidently show that entrepreneurs' access to land and rights to such land 
significantly explain their likelihood to engage in non-farm enterprises. 
When market-access regulations are weak, it is difficult and costly for new firms to enter the local 
markets as well as for existing firms to expand their operations. In this circumstance, network ties 
become a valuable source of social capital that help firms obtain land/land use rights and business 
licenses/production permits. Specifically, a broader set of connections with businesspeople 
increases the likelihood that entrepreneurs can utilise the established Quanhe (Guanxi) relationships 
with the government of one of the members in their networks to obtain access rights to the markets. 
Meanwhile, having a wider set of connections with bank officials increases the likelihood that firms 
obtain external funding (Du et al., 2015), which may help with the costly procedures in gaining 
licenses and permits. In another perspective, connections with bank officials in a state-owned 
banking system also has a signalling effect, in which government officials offer "connected" firms a 
set of favourable treatments (Arnoldi & Villadsen, 2015). Empirically,  Pham and Talavera (2018), in 
the context of Vietnam, evidently show that firms that have closer relationships with bank officials 
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and businesspeople enjoy several privileges, including first access to new markets. Since the direct 
ties are typically stronger than the indirect ties (Burt, 2007), it is naturally expected that a wider set 
of direct network ties with local authorities and government officials help firms overcome the 
weaknesses of the local market-access regulations, thereby securing their investments. In sum, we 
propose that: 
Hypothesis H2c: In Vietnam, the effects of social networks on firm investment are stronger in 
regions with weaker market-access regulations. 
5.4. Business environment 
Business environment, in this study, indicates local governance settings on (1) human resource 
regulations, (2) business support activities, and (3) bureaucratic compliance (PCI Report, 2019). 
Human resource is an essential factor of production, which is highly dependent on local governance. 
Past research suggests that regulations that increase the quantity of labour (e.g., migration laws) and 
the quality of human resource (e.g., the availability of educational or skill training centres) often give 
rise to new venture establishments (Makino & Tsang, 2011). Similarly, local governance concerning 
business support activities reduces transaction costs by promoting agglomeration establishments 
(e.g., industrial zones), local trade fairs, and other types of business subsidies (Miika Kreivi Lingyun 
Wang Matti Muhos Pekka, 2012). Also, bureaucratic compliance relates directly to how costly it is to 
go through government inspections. Du and Mickiewicz (2016) show that bureaucratic harassments 
significantly reduce entrepreneurial performance. The reason is that entrepreneurs need to allocate 
their resources to avoid being unproductively intervened by government officials. 
In a weak business environment, regulations supporting the development of local human resources 
and business activities are insufficient while unproductive interventions from the government are 
high. In such an environment, networks built upon businesspeople may help firms obtain resources 
and support. Specifically, members of a business network may exchange information and provide 
trade credits to each other. These outcomes of networking activities, to some extent, can substitute 
government organised trade fairs and subsidies. Le and Nguyen (2009), in the context of Vietnam, 
evidently show that networking with suppliers reduces the need for bank loans. 
While the network ties associated with bank officials are not directly relevant to these institutional 
forces, entrepreneurs might still utilise the signalling effects, in which they could send a positive 
message to government officials about their relationships with officials of state-owned banks. This 
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strategy may help firms avoid some of the bureaucratic harassments, thereby boosting their 
investment incentives. 
Meanwhile, a set of direct networks with local authorities and government officials help firms avoid 
bureaucratic interventions (Luo & Junkunc, 2008), obtain subsidies (Du & Mickiewicz, 2016), and 
may induce politicians to modify policies toward local workforce (e.g., open training centres for some 
specific skills and industries) that allow them to reap the benefits. These advantages thus allow 
"connected" firms to make investments despite the weaknesses in the local business environment. 
As such, we propose that: 
Hypothesis H2d: The effects of social networks on firm investment are stronger in regions with 
weaker business environment. 
5.5. Institutional openness 
Institutional openness, in this study, indicates the levels of transparency in local governance system 
and the proactiveness of local leadership (PCI Report, 2019). Transparency denotes the degree to 
which firms have access to proper planning and legal documents necessary to run their businesses, 
and whether new policies and laws are communicated to firms and predictably implemented 
(Malesky et al., 2015). Meanwhile, leadership proactivity refers to the creativity and cleverness of 
local authorities in designing and implementing policy providing initiatives for local small business 
sector development, how is authorities' reaction to the lack of clarity in central policies/documents 
and are they proactive and innovative in solving new problems (Nguyen et al., 2018). 
When institutional openness is weak, it is difficult for firms to obtain relevant information important 
to investment decisions. Moreover, it is risky to run new projects if local authorities do not show 
support to innovations and proactiveness. In this situation, networks built upon businesspeople may 
help. Specifically, in broader business networks, firms are more likely to obtain information needed 
for their strategic decisions, including information relating to planning and legal documents of local 
governments, from a member in their embedded networks, who has more substantial connections 
with the government. 
While the network ties associated with bank officials are not directly relevant to institutional 
openness, the ties associated with local authorities are. Specifically, political-specific networks allow 
firms to access to information that is unpublished (Du et al., 2015). Moreover, having Quanhe (Guanxi) 
with government officials increase the chance that firms will enjoy favouritism when running 
investment projects that are not clearly regulated by the existing regulations. Empirically, Nguyen 
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(2018), in the context of Vietnam, find that entrepreneurs having close connections with the 
government are able to identify more business opportunities despite the stagnancy of local 
authorities. Therefore, we suggest that: 
Hypothesis H2e: The effects of social networks on firm investment are stronger in regions with 
lower level of institutional openness. 
6. Data and methodology 
6.1. Data 
To test the proposed hypotheses, this study employs the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) dataset 
published by the Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM) of Vietnam. This dataset is a 
collaboration of CIEM with two other institutions, namely the Institute of Labour Science and Affairs 
of Vietnam (ILSAA), and the Development Economics Research Group (DERG) of Copenhagen 
University. 
The SME survey covers information on several operational aspects of small ventures in Vietnam, 
including their production, sales structure, investment, and employment. In addition to formally 
registered enterprises, the survey also samples a substantial number of household businesses to gain 
a comprehensive understanding of firm dynamics in Vietnam, where the informal sector is 
particularly relevant (Carbonara et al., 2020). Besides venture information, household characteristics 
of the owner-managers and their social network information are also extensively surveyed. The first 
full investigation was conducted in 2005 and has been carried out every two years thereafter. 
Approximately 2,800 small businesses in 10 provinces across Vietnam are randomly selected to 
participate in each survey. In this study, we employ the dataset over an 11-year period, from 2005 to 
2015 (6 surveys in total). 
It is noteworthy that this is an unbalanced panel as some firms may exit and other new firms may 
join into the surveys. The survey sample was drawn randomly using the stratified sampling technique 
to ensure that an adequate number of businesses with different ownership structures was included 
for each province. We thus have households (the majority), private firms, partnerships, cooperatives, 
limited liability companies, and joint stock companies. For a comprehensive understanding of the 
survey, see Rand and Tarp (2007). 
This SME dataset is then matched with the second dataset: Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI). 
This is a joint product of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce (VCCI) and the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID). This dataset is a panel of provincial governance quality. The 
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quality is scored from 0 to 100, the higher the score, the better the governance quality. The PCI index 
is calculated based on a survey of more than 17,000 domestic firms and 1,700 foreign firms across 
provinces in Vietnam. The pilot study was conducted in 2005 on one-third of the total provinces of 
Vietnam (63 provinces in total). From 2006, the PCI index became available for all provinces and is 
updated annually. 
We combine the firm-level SME dataset with the provincial level PCI dataset to create a multi-level 
panel of 11 years from 2005 to 2015. While the PCI panel is strongly balanced, the SME dataset is 
unbalanced and requires cleaning before using. Specifically, firms with no identification code and 
non-meaningful accounting information were dropped. Moreover, the outliers are controlled for by 
censoring the top and bottom 1% of observations in each variable, leaving a final sample of 9,898 
firm-year observations. 
6.2. Variables and summary statistics 
6.2.1. Dependent variable 
The primary dependent variable in this study is firm investment decision measured by investment 
rate. Specifically, Investment is the ratio of a firm’s investment value over its total capital in a period 
of two years. This investment variable is, due to the nature of the survey, slightly different from the 
conventional measures employed in previous corporate finance studies.  
First, unlike studies that assign firm investment as the difference between the fixed asset values 
across two consecutive periods, the SME survey directly asks entrepreneurs to report the values of 
investment that they made in their businesses.  
Second, the investment variable in this study captures not only fixed asset investment but also 
investment in research and development, human capital upgrading (training), patents, and additional 
working capital. It is arguable that an investment decision, whether related to fixed or intangible 
assets, is a result of the process of deliberately identifying, evaluating, and finalising business 
opportunities (Ding et al., 2013). Therefore, the investment variable constructed in this study is 
expected to thoroughly reflect the investment decisions of entrepreneurs. 
6.2.2. Independent variable 
6.2.2.1. Social Networks 
There are three social networks of interest, namely business-specific networks, bank-specific 
networks, and political-specific networks. We measure the level of effectiveness of these networks 
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using the number of network ties that an entrepreneur efficiently maintains within the respective 
categories. Specifically, we make use of the following item in the questionnaire: “Approximately, with 
how many people do you currently have regular contact (contact at least once every 3 months), which 
you find useful for your business operations in each of the following categories: (1) Businesspeople 
in the same sector (same product as the reported industry codes); (2) Bank officials; (3) Politicians 
and civil servants”. 
In particular, the three variables: Business-specific networks, Bank-specific networks, and Political-
specific networks are the numbers of active contacts with whom an entrepreneur regularly has 
contact, corresponding to the questions. 
Table 1 presents the definition and summary statistics of the variables in use. The average number 
of effective relationships in business-specific networks is much higher than the average number of 
effective relationships in the bank-specific and political-specific networks. This may represent the 
fact that small businesses are relatively weak at building social capital with local authorities and bank 
officials (Du & Mickiewicz, 2016). 
<Table 1> 
6.2.2.2. Local governance 
To measure the governance quality of local governments, we use the PCI index. The PCI score ranges 
from 0 to 100, the higher the score, the better the quality of government. PCI index is constituted 
from other nine sub-indices3, including:  
Legal institutions, a measure of the private sector's confidence in provincial legal institutions; 
whether firms regard provincial legal institutions as an effective vehicle for contracting dispute 
resolution, or if they constitute a viable avenue for appealing against corrupt official behaviour. 
Corruption, a measure of how much firms pay in informal charges, how much of an obstacle those 
extra fees pose for their business operations, and whether payment of those extra fees garners the 
expected results or “services”. 
Entry costs, a measure of the length of business registration in days, the number of licenses and 
permits necessary to start operations, and the percentage of firms that need additional 
licenses/permits. Land access, which is a measure combining two dimensions of the land problems 
 
3 Summary statistics of the nine sub-indices are reported in Appendix A. 
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confronting entrepreneurs: how easy it is to access land and the security of tenure once land is 
acquired. These two indices represent market-access regulations. 
Business support, a measure of provincial regulations and services for private sector trade promotion, 
provision of regulatory information to firms, business partner matchmaking, provision of industrial 
zones or industrial clusters, and technological services for firms; and Labour and training, which is a 
measure of the regulations promulgated by provincial authorities to promote vocational training and 
skills development for local industries and to assist in the placement of local labour. Time costs, which 
is a measure of how much time firms waste on bureaucratic compliance, as well as how often and for 
how long firms must shut down their operations for inspections by local regulatory agencies. These 
three indices represent local business environment regulations. 
Transparency, which is a measure of whether firms have access to the proper planning and legal 
documents necessary to run their businesses, whether those documents are equitably available, 
whether new policies and laws are communicated to firms and predictably implemented. Leadership 
proactivity, a measure of the creativity and cleverness of provinces in implementing central policy, 
designing their own initiatives for private sector development, and working within sometimes 
unclear national regulatory frameworks to assist and interpret them in favour of local private firms. 
These two indices represent the openness of local governance. 
We have tried combining nine PCI sub-indices into these five dimensions of local governance. 
However, the values of Cronbach Alpha are lower than 0.7 – the conventional acceptance level of 
interitem correlations. This may be due to the fact that there is substantial heterogeneity among the 
indices classified in one governance dimension. As such, in the empirical tests, we treat each PCI sub-
index as an independent variable grouped in a theoretical framework of five governance dimensions. 
6.2.3. Control variables 
The model also controls for covariates that may influence investment decisions. At the venture level 
it includes conventional variables such as firm age and firm size. These variables represent the firm-
specific characteristics that significantly determine the rate, value, and frequency of investment 
(Valliere & Peterson, 2009; Zhou, 2017). In addition, external finance is also an important 
determinant of investment decisions. As such, we use two variables to address this issue: Liability, 
which is the ratio of a firm’s total liability over its total capital; and Bank loans, a dummy variable that 
takes value 0 if a firm did not take out bank loans in the previous period, and value 1 if a firm has 
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borrowed from a bank in the previous period. The use of these two variables could also isolate the 
non-networking-related financing factors that drive investment decision. 
At the individual level, the study account for owner age. This variable may influence investment 
decisions because it indicates the experience of entrepreneurs, which have a marked influence on 
their propensity to recognise and evaluate business opportunities (Nguyen, 2018). 
To control for regional time-invariant factors that may influence local firm investment, a set of 10 
province dummies are included in the model. Finally, the authors note that some entrepreneurs may 
make investments because of the available industry-specific and business-cycle-specific 
opportunities. As such, following Ding et al. (2013) and Guariglia et al. (2011), the model includes a 
set of the interaction terms between industry dummies and year dummies, on top of their individual 
dummies. This method could control for industry-level time-variant fluctuations over a year, this 
being a good proxy for business opportunities. 4  The pairwise correlation matrix of variables is 
presented in Appendix B. 
It is noteworthy that all other effects such as industry sectors, types of ownership, and owner-
manager backgrounds and management characteristics are absorbed by the fixed-effects estimation 
method introduced subsequently. 
6.3. Empirical specification and estimation 
We propose the following reduced-form investment equation: 
 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑡)
+ 𝛽4(𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑔𝑡)               
+𝑣𝑖 +  𝑣𝑡 +   𝑣𝑗𝑡 + 𝑣𝑔 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  
where 𝑖 denotes an individual venture, 𝑔 is the province, and 𝑡 a year. As such, 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑡  is the 
investment rate of firm 𝑖 in province 𝑔 in year 𝑡. The term 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑡 is a vector of firm age, 
labour size, liability ratio, and bank loans. 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑡  includes owner age. The terms 
𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑡 includes three types of networks: business-specific, bank-specific, and political-
specific. Finally, 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑔𝑡  indicates the PCI index and the nine sub-indices, respectively. 
 




The investment function also has a time-specific component 𝑣𝑡 , and an industry-specific time-specific 
component 𝑣𝑗𝑡 . These effects are controlled by the corresponding dummy variables. Firm-specific 
time-invariant characteristics are captured in 𝑣𝑖 , and region-specific time-invariant characteristics 
are captured in 𝑣𝑔. This study controls for these components by estimating the equation using a fixed-
effects technique that accounts for the multi-level clustered structure of the observations.5 The fixed-
effects estimator could deal, to some extent, with unobservable heterogeneity and the potential 
endogeneity of missing (time-invariant) variables in the model. To reduce endogeneity concerns, all 
variables that may suffer from reverse effects are lagged one year. These variables are firm size, 
liability, and bank loans. Finally, 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is the idiosyncratic component of the error. 
We also test multicollinearity among the regressors using a variance inflation factor (VIF) test and 
find no evidence of its presence. However, using the Cumby–Huizinga test for autocorrelation of the 
current error term with the error terms up to five lags, we find that autocorrelation is significant. 
Following that, we estimate the equations with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) robust 
standard errors, choosing a bandwidth of five (the highest possible, considering the time length of 
the data used). The use of bandwidth, combined with robust HAC standard errors, produces 
estimates that are robust to both arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary autocorrelation. 
7. Results 
The regression results are presented in Table 2 to Table 6.  Specifically, Table 2 shows the baseline 
regressions of the three types of networks. Table 3 shows the interaction effects between the three 
types of networks and local governance. Table 4-6 presents the interaction effects between each type 
of networks and the nine governance forces. To facilitate the interpretation and simplify the format 
of the tables, the dependent variable, which is the ratio of investment over total capital, is multiplied 
by 100. 
<Table 2> 
The coefficients associated with local governance quality (PCI index) are positive and statistically 
significant in most specifications, indicating that improved governance quality will boost local small 
businesses’ investment incentives. In Table 2 for example, on average, the coefficients associated 
with local governance quality is approximately 0.2, indicating that when the local PCI index improves 
by one point, local firms will increase their investments by 0.2% of total capital, holding all else 
 
5 The reghdfe program in Stata, which sets to absorb both firm ID cluster and province ID cluster. 
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constant. Even though we did not explicitly hypothesise the influence of local governance on firm 
investment, this result is consistent with the institutional theory and sets a solid foundation for the 
analysis of the interaction effects. 
In terms of networking effects, as being shown in Table 2, the coefficient associated with total 
networks in column 1 is positive and significant, showing that social capital plays an essential role in 
boosting firm investments. Having a look at the types of networks, it is found that bank-specific 
(column 3) and political-specific networks (column 4) are crucial for firm investments. Business-
specific networks, interestingly, do not exert significant impacts on investment decisions. It is 
noteworthy that, in the lump-sum specification (column 5), political-specific networks lose their 
statistical meaning, leaving bank-specific networks as the only statistically significant variable among 
the three. This finding implies that financial capital is the most important determinant of firm 
investment decisions in Vietnam. Therefore, hypothesis H1a is not supported, H1b is fully supported, 
and H1c is supported to some extent. 
The general results are, however, explainable. In a transition economy with a burgeoning middle-
class fuelling increased market diversity and a demand for high-quality goods and services, 
entrepreneurs are unlikely to lack business opportunities. Nonetheless, the extant economic and 
institutional renovation struggles to keep pace with the growth of the market-oriented private sector, 
leading to a situation in which the entrepreneurs who first gain access to finance can leverage their 
position to extract the available opportunities. 
<Table 3> 
Table 3 investigates the moderating effect of social networks on the relationship between local 
governance and firm investments. In column 1, the coefficient associated with the interaction term is 
negative and statistically significant. This finding implies that networking in general is more 
important in regions that have weaker institutions (in this case, local governance quality). This initial 
result sets the groundwork to examine in detail the moderating effects the three specific types of 
networks. 
Among the three types of networks, only political-specific networks can substitute the weaknesses 
of local governance. This finding remains robust either in a separate specification (column 4) or in a 
lump-sum specification (column 5). It is noteworthy that the impact of bank-specific networks 
remain statistically significant but it has no moderating effect. Meanwhile, similar to the results found 
in Table 2, business-specific networks appear non-significant to firm investments. 
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The results obtained from Table 1 and Table 2 point to a general picture of the importance of different 
types of social networks in Vietnam: bank-specific networks are essential to boost firm investment 
(also the strongest networks in terms of economic effects) but fail to help firms overcome 
institutional voids; political-specific networks even though do not directly influence firm investments, 
can help them cope with the weaknesses of the local institutional environments; meanwhile, 
business-specific networks seem to be trivial in the investment decisions. 
Next, we examine the interaction terms between each type of networks and the nine local governance 
forces. Also, from the results obtained in Table 3, we know that political-specific networks exert a 
moderating effect while business-specific and bank-specific networks do not. As such, we expect that 
there are more significant interaction terms between political-specific networks and the nine PCI 
sub-indices than those of business-specific and bank-specific networks. 
<Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6> 
The results obtained from these Tables indicate that networking cannot substitute all weaknesses of 
local governance. Specifically, in Table 4, only the coefficient associated with the interaction term 
between business-specific networks and time cost is significant. Meanwhile, in Table 5, only the 
coefficient associated with the interaction term between bank-specific networks and business 
support is significant. These findings are consistent with the results obtained from Table 3, in which 
the interaction terms between these two types of networks with the PCI index are insignificant. 
However, Table 6 shows that political-specific networks are able to moderate the weaknesses of 5 
out of 9 governance forces. Table 7 summarises these findings in association with hypotheses H2a to 
H2e. 
<Table 7> 
Regarding the control variables, firm size is insignificant in most specifications, indicating that there 
may be no difference in investment decisions between smaller and larger firms. This finding could be 
explained by the fact that the sample in our analysis is a set of evenly small-sized businesses. The 
coefficients associated with financial liability are negative, indicating that the more debts firms have, 
the fewer investments they make, probably because of financial distress. Meanwhile, the coefficients 
associated with bank loans are positive, showing that the more bank loans firms obtain, the more 
investments they make. In terms of the individual variable – owner age appears to have a statistically 




This study investigates the influence of social networks and local governance on the investment 
decisions of small businesses. The context of analysis is Vietnam, a developing country with a 
transition economy. The key research objectives are to understand whether social networks could 
substitute for the weaknesses of local governance settings; and if they do, what types of network are 
more important. 
To address these research aims, social networks are examined from three perspectives: business-
specific ties; bank-specific ties; and political-specific ties. Meanwhile, local governance is employed 
as a proxy for institutional quality. Our model enables cross-level interaction between firm-level 
social networks and regional-level governance quality. 
This study makes a set of contributions to the literature that investigates the investment decisions 
made by small businesses. 
First, this study evidently shows that social capital derived from different types of networks may 
induce significantly different impacts on firm investments. Previous studies, whether focusing on an 
examination of the structure of networks (i.e., the number and the intensity of general social 
contacts), or analysing the relational aspects of networks (i.e., investigating whom one is connected 
with), are unable to draw a complete picture of the effects of social capital on entrepreneurship 
(Alexy et al., 2012; Chun & Miller, 2010). This study stands in sharp distinction to the extant literature 
by analysing in detail different aspects of social networks. Specifically, we distinguish between 
business-specific networks, bank-specific networks, and political-specific networks. 
Second, this study highlights the relevance of local institutions, specifically the governance quality of 
local government, in facilitating entrepreneurial activities. Our findings show that local institutional 
settings have significant influence on the entrepreneurial investments. A set of well-organised local 
governance arrangements provides entrepreneurs with productive resources such as land, labour, 
and public administrative support, while reducing bureaucratic harassments from local public 
servants and protecting entrepreneurs from potential appropriation. As such, this study serves as an 
echo of recent publications (Du & Mickiewicz, 2016; Nguyen et al., 2013) that call for more research 
into the influence of local institutions on local entrepreneurship and small businesses. 
Third, this study shows the substitution between social networks and institutions. Social networks 
may be seen as an initial form of small-scale institutions, in which members operate under the 
umbrella of a set of social network settings that are regulated by the group and which incentivise 
group members to maintain their membership status by following the pre-set reciprocal group 
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expectations. This study subscribes to the view of Hayami (2009) in which the concept of social 
capital should be linked to the concept of institutions in order to understand how social behaviour 
evolves. The particular coherence between social capital and institutions implies that in situations 
where the institutions are not sufficiently strong, entrepreneurs will rely on social networks to 
facilitate transactions and obtain/share resources (Ko & Liu, 2017). 
Also, the empirical findings in this study extend our understanding of the nature of social networks 
and their influence on the investment decisions of small businesses in developing countries. We show 
that business-specific networks do not help entrepreneurs to realise investment opportunities, but 
that bank-specific networks do. The latter is less related to opportunity formation and evaluation, 
but are concerned rather with the finalisation of opportunities, in which entrepreneurs try to seek 
funding from external financiers (banks). This finding implies that the key obstacles for 
entrepreneurs in developing countries are not so much the lack of business opportunities, but rather 
a deficiency of capital (financing constraints), and support from local authorities. 
More importantly, we suggest some potential mechanisms through which networking may help 
address the weaknesses of local governance quality. Specifically, we find that social capital appears 
more important in regions that have problems with their legal enforcement, transparency, 
corruption, and bureaucracy. Entrepreneurs, by utilising their networks, especially networks built 
upon connections with local government officials may overcome institutional voids stemmed from 
the weaknesses of these governance forces and make more investments subsequently. 
This study provides a set of implications for policymakers who strive to boost entrepreneurial 
activities in developing countries. First, networking is important to entrepreneurial investments, but 
from the aggregated viewpoint, may not be beneficial to the economic performance of the society as 
a whole. Du and Mickiewicz (2016) show that political affiliation is associated with the misallocation 
of resources and economic opportunities, which are given to favoured entrepreneurs who would not 
otherwise have been selected by market mechanisms. It is also noteworthy that the relationships 
built with bank officials and local authorities need frequent reinforcement (e.g., gift-giving and 
entertaining officials); from the entrepreneurs’ perspective, these are unproductive activities. 
Therefore, local authorities should aim to build and maintain a set of efficient governance systems 
that can generate trust in the local entrepreneur communities without requiring unproductive 
investments in building social networks. 
For entrepreneurs in weak institutional environments, building social networks is an efficient 
strategy to acquire the business opportunities and resources required for investments. However, 
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they should pay attention to the benefits associated with each type of network as some networks are 
more efficient than the others. 
This study is not without limitations that should be acknowledged, but they also provide potential 
avenues for future research. First, this study only analyses the impacts of social capital on the final 
stage of investment, i.e., investment realisation. Due to the limitation of the dataset, we are not able 
to observe the processes whereby entrepreneurs identify and evaluate opportunities. As such, we 
have not yet been able to analyse the effects of social networks on the earlier stage of investment 
decisions. Future studies may design questionnaires that capture the entire process of the investment 
decision and investigate the influence of social capital on each stage of the process. Also, the 
generalisability of this study may be limited because the sample was restricted to Vietnamese firms.  
Future studies therefore should extend the proposed framework and re-test it in other contexts. 
Further, the dataset employed in this study is quite small in a short period of time. Future research 
should re-test the validity of our findings using a larger dataset with longer survey periods. Finally, 
due to the limited information available in the SME survey, we are mostly restricted to the use of 
variables that capture only the relational aspect of social capital. Future study may design 
questionnaires that capture both the relational and structural aspects of social networks, which 
would allow for a deeper understanding of the impact of social capital on firm investments. 
9. Conclusion 
This study investigates the importance of a set of social networks, specifically business-specific ties, 
bank-specific ties, and political-specific ties, on small business investments in Vietnam. The results 
show that bank-specific networks can boost firm investments, whereas business-specific networks 
appear trivial to firm investments. Also, we suggest that entrepreneurs can utilise their social 
networks, especially political-specific networks to overcome institutional voids stemmed from the 
lower quality of local legal institutions, higher levels of corruption, higher demands for bureaucratic 
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Tables and Figures: 
Table 1: Variable Definition and Summary Statistics  
Variable Definition Mean SD Min Max 
Investment Firm investment as a ratio of total capital in a 
survey period (two years) 
10.019 20.491 0 130.790 
Local governance quality The PCI index, ranging from 0 to 100. The 
higher the value, the better the quality of 
governance 
57.883 4.176 49.757 67.12 
Firm age Firm age since establishment 18.265 12.531 3 62 
Firm size Natural log of the number of employees (report 
here the number of employees) 
14.989 28.723 1 199 
Liability The ratio of firm liability over total capital 0.092 0.185 0 1.078 
Bank loans Takes value 1 if a firm takes out bank loans in 
the previous period (the last 2 years), 0 
otherwise 
0.562 0.496 0 1 
Owner age Age of the owner of the small businesses 46.035 10.564 17 94 
Business-specific networks The number of effective contacts with 
businesspeople (see table note for the 
definition of effectiveness) 
25.179 23.122 0 195 
Bank-specific networks The number of effective contacts with bank 
officials 
1.022 1.606 0 10 
Politician-specific networks The number of effective contacts with 
government officials 
1.402 1.937 0 10 
Note: Effective contacts are the contacts that entrepreneurs get in touch with at least once every 3 months and who are 
useful for their business operations. The statistics are provided for 9,898 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2015. 




Table 2: Baseline Model Results  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Local governance 0.197* 0.206** 0.187* 0.208** 0.193* 
 (0.103) (0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) 
Total networks 0.021***     
 (0.008)     
Business-specific networks  0.015   -0.006 
  (0.010)   (0.010) 
Bank-specific networks   1.358***  1.379*** 
   (0.150)  (0.160) 
Political-specific networks    0.345*** -0.014 
    (0.117) (0.124) 
Firm age 0.254*** 0.230*** 0.242*** 0.238*** 0.247*** 
 (0.087) (0.085) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) 
Firm size -0.157 -0.161 -0.228 -0.198 -0.273 
 (0.509) (0.500) (0.504) (0.504) (0.506) 
Liability -5.322** -5.482** -5.567** -5.563** -5.433** 
 (2.289) (2.262) (2.247) (2.281) (2.262) 
Bank loans 2.120*** 2.131*** 1.973*** 2.062*** 1.931*** 
 (0.644) (0.638) (0.634) (0.639) (0.636) 
Owner age -0.041 -0.035 -0.037 -0.036 -0.039 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
VIF 4.864 4.652 4.688 4.624 6.841 
Observations 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 
R-squared 0.408 0.407 0.416 0.408 0.415 
Note: The dependent variable is firm investments as a ratio of total capital times 100. The estimator is fixed-
effects (reghdfe in Stata), clustering both firm ID and province ID. A set of 6-year dummies, and the interaction 
terms between year dummies and industry dummies are included. Standard errors and test statistics are 
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The variables: firm size, bank loans, and 
liability are lagged one period. * indicates 10% significant level; ** indicates 5% significant level; *** indicates 




Table 3: Three Types of Networks and Local Governance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Local governance 0.310*** 0.191* 0.036 0.148 0.027 
 (0.109) (0.115) (0.209) (0.185) (0.164) 
Total networks 0.157*     
 (0.090)     
Total networks × Local governance -0.006***     
 (0.002)     
Business-specific networks  -0.028   0.111 
  (0.178)   (0.208) 
Business-specific networks × Local governance  0.001   -0.002 
  (0.003)   (0.004) 
Bank-specific networks   7.820*  5.978* 
   (4.120)  (3.059) 
Bank-specific networks × Local governance   -0.105  -0.074 
   (0.069)  (0.052) 
Political-specific networks    5.941** 5.016** 
    (2.582) (2.481) 
Political-specific networks× Local governance    -0.100** -0.084** 
    (0.043) (0.042) 
Firm age 0.260*** 0.230*** -1.035*** -0.252** -0.149 
 (0.095) (0.086) (0.180) (0.126) (0.131) 
Firm size -0.200 -0.162 -1.244 -0.913 -1.096* 
 (0.504) (0.500) (0.815) (0.607) (0.613) 
Liability -6.290*** -5.486** -7.667** -4.548 -4.259 
 (2.281) (2.262) (3.193) (2.824) (2.801) 
Bank loans 2.153*** 2.134*** 0.318 1.290 1.285 
 (0.642) (0.638) (0.936) (0.796) (0.797) 
Owner age -0.026 -0.035 0.073 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.062) (0.048) (0.049) 
VIF 5.421 5.628 5.998 4.257 8.241 
Observations 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 
R-squared 0.407 0.407 0.518 0.459 0.473 
Note: The dependent variable is firm investments as a ratio of total capital times 100. The estimator is fixed-
effects (reghdfe in Stata), clustering both firm ID and province ID. A set of 6-year dummies, and the interaction 
terms between year dummies and industry dummies are included. Standard errors and test statistics are 
asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The variables: firm size, bank loans, and 
liability are lagged one period. * indicates 10% significant level; ** indicates 5% significant level; *** indicates 




Table 4: Business-specific Networks and Nine Forces of Local Governance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Business-specific network 0.115 0.096 0.151 -0.088 0.232** 0.039 0.070 0.011 0.075 
 (0.098) (0.130) (0.117) (0.070) (0.117) (0.131) (0.110) (0.157) (0.054) 
Legal institutions 2.100***         
 (0.701)         
Bus. network × Legal institutions -0.020         
 (0.018)         
Corruption  1.624**        
  (0.793)        
Bus. network × Corruption  -0.016        
  (0.023)        
Entry costs   1.623***       
   (0.571)       
Bus. network × Entry costs   -0.020       
   (0.014)       
Land access    0.949      
    (0.603)      
Bus.  network × Land access    0.015      
    (0.013)      
Time costs     2.525***     
     (0.786)     
Bus.  network × Time costs     -0.040**     
     (0.019)     
Business support      0.141    
      (0.697)    
Bus.  network × Business support      -0.006    
      (0.022)    
Labour training       2.589***   
       (0.769)   
Bus. network × Labour training       -0.014   
       (0.020)   
Transparency        -0.478  
        (0.723)  
Bus. network × Transparency        0.002  
        (0.025)  
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Leadership proactivity         1.866*** 
         (0.479) 
Bus.  network × Leadership proactivity         -0.018 
         (0.011) 
Firm age -0.834*** -0.882*** 0.266** 0.080 -0.187 -1.000*** -0.258** 0.558*** 0.001 
 (0.185) (0.178) (0.117) (0.116) (0.127) (0.183) (0.125) (0.196) (0.145) 
Firm size -0.968 -1.013 -0.561 -0.585 -0.912 -0.953 -0.771 -0.496 -0.871 
 (0.799) (0.799) (0.627) (0.627) (0.606) (0.797) (0.607) (0.747) (0.605) 
Liability -8.195** -7.959** -8.407*** -8.257*** -4.476 -8.084** -4.662* -3.008 -4.820* 
 (3.268) (3.247) (2.642) (2.634) (2.782) (3.250) (2.779) (3.476) (2.790) 
Bank loans 0.098 0.105 2.244*** 2.251*** 1.366* 0.105 1.262 0.706 1.350* 
 (0.916) (0.921) (0.722) (0.718) (0.785) (0.920) (0.786) (1.074) (0.782) 
Owner age 0.067 0.067 -0.028 -0.030 -0.018 0.069 -0.014 0.031 -0.013 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.042) (0.042) (0.048) (0.059) (0.048) (0.059) (0.048) 
VIF 5.410 5.232 5.681 5.268 5.654 5.521 5.231 5.336 7.652 
Observations 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 
R-squared 0.505 0.504 0.429 0.430 0.461 0.503 0.462 0.522 0.462 
Note: The dependent variable is firm investments as a ratio of total capital times 100. The estimator is fixed-effects (reghdfe in Stata), clustering both firm 
ID and province ID. A set of 6-year dummies, and the interaction terms between year dummies and industry dummies are included. Standard errors and 
test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The variables: firm size, bank loans, and liability are lagged one period. 










Table 5: Bank-specific Networks and Nine Forces of Local Governance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Bank-specific network -0.826 -0.105 1.618 -0.744 0.921 2.192 -2.188 0.350 -0.628 
 (1.598) (1.223) (1.755) (1.002) (1.563) (1.535) (1.670) (1.383) (0.836) 
Legal institutions 1.424**         
 (0.610)         
Bank. network × Legal institutions 0.065         
 (0.305)         
Corruption  0.263        
  (0.447)        
Bank. network × Corruption  -0.052        
  (0.204)        
Entry costs   1.378***       
   (0.470)       
Bank. network × Entry costs   -0.279       
   (0.221)       
Land access    1.241**      
    (0.544)      
Bank. network × Land access    0.025      
    (0.188)      
Time costs     1.768***     
     (0.656)     
Bank. network × Time costs     -0.223     
     (0.262)     
Business support      0.314    
      (0.550)    
Bank. network × Business support      -0.475*    
      (0.258)    
Labour training       1.811***   
       (0.679)   
Bank. network × Labour training       0.318   
       (0.301)   
Transparency        -0.517  
        (0.515)  
Bank. network × Transparency        -0.130  
        (0.234)  
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Leadership proactivity         1.371*** 
         (0.415) 
Bank. network × Leadership proactivity         0.048 
         (0.190) 
Firm age -0.824*** -0.226* 0.243** 0.063 -0.197 -0.887*** -0.287** -0.205 -0.010 
 (0.187) (0.129) (0.118) (0.117) (0.130) (0.189) (0.129) (0.131) (0.148) 
Firm size -0.958 -0.905 -0.499 -0.536 -0.919 -0.905 -0.819 -0.878 -0.867 
 (0.809) (0.612) (0.637) (0.639) (0.611) (0.792) (0.613) (0.614) (0.609) 
Liability -8.096** -4.707* -8.147*** -8.018*** -4.606 -7.542** -4.765* -4.629 -4.971* 
 (3.343) (2.823) (2.667) (2.665) (2.827) (3.259) (2.810) (2.828) (2.824) 
Bank loans 0.436 1.455* 2.148*** 2.112*** 1.471* -0.317 1.403* 1.418* 1.489* 
 (0.925) (0.798) (0.729) (0.728) (0.798) (0.951) (0.799) (0.798) (0.794) 
Owner age 0.067 -0.012 -0.028 -0.031 -0.014 0.069 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.061) (0.049) (0.043) (0.043) (0.049) (0.059) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
VIF 5.012 5.325 5.007 5.632 5.951 5.014 5.335 5.287 7.665 
Observations 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 
R-squared 0.508 0.462 0.431 0.431 0.463 0.506 0.464 0.462 0.464 
Note: The dependent variable is firm investments as a ratio of total capital times 100. The estimator is fixed-effects (reghdfe in Stata), clustering both firm 
ID and province ID. A set of 6-year dummies, and the interaction terms between year dummies and industry dummies are included. Standard errors and 
test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The variables: firm size, bank loans, and liability are lagged one period. 










Table 6: Political-specific Networks and Nine Forces of Local Governance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Political-specific network 3.968*** 7.040** 1.020 1.871** 2.685 -0.076 1.619 4.128** 1.127* 
 (1.233) (3.077) (1.816) (0.819) (1.833) (0.692) (1.125) (1.938) (0.672) 
Legal institutions 2.174***         
 (0.549)         
Pol. network × Legal institutions -0.659***         
 (0.228)         
Corruption  1.292        
  (1.446)        
Pol. network × Corruption  -1.251**        
  (0.531)        
Entry costs   1.017*       
   (0.559)       
Pol. network × Entry costs   -0.079       
   (0.226)       
Land access    1.647***      
    (0.519)      
Pol. network × Land access    -0.261*      
    (0.144)      
Time costs     0.192     
     (0.837)     
Pol. network × Time costs     -0.492     
     (0.307)     
Business support      1.530***    
      (0.421)    
Pol. network × Business support      -0.000    
      (0.110)    
Labour training       2.658***   
       (0.676)   
Pol. network × Labour training       -0.328   
       (0.206)   
Transparency        1.632*  
        (0.958)  
Pol. network × Transparency        -0.688**  
        (0.320)  
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Leadership proactivity         1.739*** 
         (0.409) 
Pol. network × Leadership proactivity         -0.251* 
         (0.147) 
Firm age -0.931*** -0.225 -0.114 -0.330** -1.052*** -0.150 -0.255** -0.177 -0.053 
 (0.194) (0.344) (0.141) (0.138) (0.200) (0.128) (0.125) (0.153) (0.148) 
Firm size -0.899 -0.299 -0.813 -0.751 -0.956 -0.756 -0.758 -0.903 -0.893 
 (0.803) (0.953) (0.613) (0.610) (0.803) (0.606) (0.607) (0.609) (0.607) 
Liability -7.785** -3.701 -4.375 -4.255 -8.085** -4.846* -4.616* -4.747* -4.762* 
 (3.250) (4.738) (2.781) (2.772) (3.333) (2.789) (2.778) (2.816) (2.823) 
Bank loans 0.289 -2.363 1.385* 1.430* 0.342 1.321* 1.247 1.242 1.300 
 (0.937) (1.500) (0.800) (0.798) (0.916) (0.784) (0.786) (0.795) (0.793) 
Owner age 0.062 0.115 -0.015 -0.016 0.069 -0.015 -0.013 -0.007 -0.005 
 (0.060) (0.086) (0.049) (0.049) (0.060) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
VIF 5.664 5.632 5.421 5.976 5.368 5.221 5.871 5.367 7.225 
Observations 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 9,898 
R-squared 0.459 0.459 0.459 0.506 0.612 0.461 0.462 0.462 0.512 
Note: The dependent variable is firm investments as a ratio of total capital times 100. The estimator is fixed-effects (reghdfe in Stata), clustering both firm 
ID and province ID. A set of 6-year dummies, and the interaction terms between year dummies and industry dummies are included. Standard errors and 
test statistics are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The variables: firm size, bank loans, and liability are lagged one period. 




















Legal institutions Legal institutions Non-supported Non-supported Supported 
Corruption Corruption Non-supported Non-supported Supported 
Market-access 
regulations 
Land access Non-supported Non-supported Supported 
Entry costs Non-supported Non-supported Non-supported 
Business 
environment 
Labour training Non-supported Non-supported Non-supported 
Business support Non-supported Supported Non-supported 
Bureaucracy compliance Supported Non-supported Non-supported 
Institutional 
openness 
Transparency Non-supported Non-supported Supported 





Appendix A: Definition and Summary Statistics of PCI Sub-indices 
Note: The panel encompasses 10 provinces and municipal cities in Vietnam that has conducted the SME surveys 
in the period 2005-2015, obtained from the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) dataset. 
 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Legal 
institutions 
Measures the confidence in provincial legal institutions; whether firms 
regard provincial legal institutions as an effective vehicle for dispute 
resolution, or as an avenue for lodging appeals against corrupt official 
behaviour. The indicator ranges from 1 to 10; the higher the score, the 
better the institutions. 
4.86 0.96 2.98 6.80 
Entry costs Measures the differences in entry costs for new firms across provinces 
(for example, length of business registration in days, etc.). The 
indicator ranges from 1 to 10; the higher the score, the lower the entry 
costs. 
7.77 0.81 5.73 9.13 
Land access Combines two dimensions of the land problems confronting 
entrepreneurs: how easy it is to access land and the security of tenure 
once land is acquired. The variable ranges from 1 to 10; the higher the 
score, the better the access. 
5.07 1.42 2.06 8.37 
Time costs Measures how much time firms waste on bureaucratic compliance, as 
well as how often and for how long firms must shut down their 
operations for inspections by local regulatory agencies. The indicator 
ranges from 1 to 10; the higher the score, the lower the time waste.  
5.86 0.74 3.88 7.89 
Business 
supports 
Measures provincial services for trade promotion, provision of 
regulatory information to firms, business partner matchmaking, 
provision of industrial zones or industrial clusters, and technological 
services for firms. The indicator ranges from 1 to 10; the higher the 
score, the better the support. 
6.23 1.29 3.05 8.73 
Labour 
training 
Measures the efforts by provincial authorities to promote vocational 
training and skills development for local industries and to assist in the 
placement of local labour. The indicator ranges from 1 to 10; the higher 
the score, the better the training. 
5.77 0.86 3.85 7.36 
Corruption Measures how much firms pay in bribes, how much of an obstacle 
those extra fees pose for their business operations, whether payment 
of those extra fees results in expected results or "services," and 
whether provincial officials use compliance with local regulations to 
extract rents. The indicator ranges from 1 to 10; the higher the score, 
the better the corruption controls. 
5.63 0.85 4.26 7.90 
Transparency Measures whether firms have access to the proper planning and legal 
documents necessary to run their businesses, whether those 
documents are equitably available, and whether new policies and laws 
are communicated to firms and predictably implemented. The 
indicator ranges from 1 to 10; the higher the score, the more 
transparent. 
5.35 1.46 2.26 7.15 
Leadership 
proactivity 
Measures the creativity and cleverness of provinces in implementing 
central policy, designing their own initiatives for private sector 
development, and working within sometimes unclear national 
regulatory frameworks to assist and interpret them in favour of local 
private firms. The indicator ranges from 1 to 10; the higher the score, 
the more proactive.  
4.56 1.03 1.39 6.89 
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Appendix B: Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Investment (1)           
Business-specific networks (2) 0.041          
Bank-specific networks (3) 0.188 0.235         
Political-specific networks (4) 0.048 0.230 0.371        
Local governance (5) -0.046 -0.009 -0.017^ 0.037       
Owner age (6) -0.100 -0.020 -0.005 0.025^ -0.040      
Firm age (7) -0.141 -0.029 -0.033 0.001^ -0.054 0.358     
Firm size (8) 0.126 0.149 0.252 0.160 0.051 -0.043 -0.108    
Liability (9) 0.467 0.058 0.268 0.047 -0.012^ -0.065 -0.134 0.206   
Bank loans (10) -0.247 -0.065 -0.305 -0.092 -0.051 0.025^ 0.047 -0.171 -0.313  
Note: All correlation coefficients are significant at 1% except for coefficients with ^ are significant at 5%. 
 
